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A FAMILY SYSTEMS PARADIGM FOR
LEGAL DECISION MAKING AFFECTING
CHILD CUSTODY
Susan L. Brookst
INTRODUCTION
Sarah, a twelve-year-old child, was raped by the boyfriend of her
mother, Ms. P.1 Ms. P. denied the rape. After an investigation, the
state's department of human services filed a petition in juvenile court
alleging that Sarah was dependent and neglected in that her mother failed
to protect her from the perpetrator. The judge appointed a lawyer for
Ms. P. and a separate Guardian Ad Litem ("GAL") lawyer to represent
Sarah's "best interests." Despite Sarah's insistence that she wanted to
remain with her mother, the judge ordered that Sarah be removed from
Ms. P.'s home and placed in state custody.
The state agency caseworker placed Sarah in the home of Sarah's
maternal aunt and uncle and enrolled her in individual counseling, which
Sarah reluctantly attended for a brief period. Sarah's individual coun-
selor never spoke with Ms. P.
Meanwhile, the state purportedly was providing services to Ms. P.
to assist her in achieving the goal of reunification with Sarah. At the
ninety-day review hearing, the caseworker stated that she had stopped
making efforts with Sarah's mother because Ms. P. was "hostile" to-
wards her. The judge ordered the caseworker to continue assisting Ms.
P. to achieve reunification but did not specify how this should be
accomplished.
During the next year, Sarah's placement with her relatives fell apart,
and she experienced a series of emergency temporary placements and
foster homes. Sarah spent a month, including Christmas, in a locked in-
patient psychiatric unit for children and adolescents, where she refused to
eat or participate in activities. The hospital staff labeled Sarah as se-
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verely depressed and attempted to give her anti-depressant medication,
which Sarah refused to take. After being released from the hospital,
where the staff admitted they were not helping her, Sarah was placed in
an emergency shelter for thirty days. The shelter's staff also attempted to
medicate Sarah with anti-depressants against her will.
Throughout these months, Sarah insisted she was not "crazy" and
that she just wanted to be with her mother. She was virtually cut off
from her family, except for limited telephone contact. Meanwhile, the
caseworker (who acknowledged that she had placed Sarah in the hospital
and shelter because she did not know what to do with her) was struggling
to find a foster home for Sarah. When the caseworker finally did find a
foster home, the arrangement failed within a week. Sarah's second fos-
ter home also failed within a short time. Meanwhile, the state still pro-
vided no services to Ms. P. and Sarah to facilitate reunification.
At the eighteen-month permanency hearing,2 the judge discovered
that Ms. P.'s seven-year-old daughter Rachel was living with her.3 The
judge expressed shock and concern that the state agency had never inter-
vened in any manner on Rachel's behalf. Ms. P. and Rachel were home-
less at this point, and Rachel was not attending school on a regular basis,
but Ms. P. and Rachel were not receiving any assistance from the state.
The judge ordered that Rachel also be placed in foster care. In the
months following the permanency hearing, the family's situation finally
began to improve. Sarah's third foster home turned out to be a support-
ive environment. Her new foster mother understood the importance of
Sarah and Ms. P.'s relationship and also accepted Sarah's sister Rachel
into her home.
Moreover, the agency overseeing the foster home arranged for a
family therapist to become involved with this family. Through family
therapy, the family members were able to work through their unresolved
feelings, and Ms. P. was able to re-establish her role as the mother of the
family. The agency also offered assistance to Ms. P. with finding hous-
2 The permanency hearing is a special hearing required under federal and state law. See
Mary Lee Allen et al., A Guide to the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, in
FOSTER CHILDREN IN THE COURTS 575, 582-83 (Mark Hardin ed., 1983) (citing Social Security
Act § 475(5)(B), 42 U.S.C.A. § 675(5)(B) (West Supp. 1981 reunification )); see, e.g., TENN.
CODE ANN. § 37-2-409 (1991) (Tennessee code provision requiring judge or referee to hold
hearing within eighteen months of foster care placement to determine necessity of continued
placement, extent of compliance with foster care plan, extent of progress, and future plan for
child and family). At the hearing, the court is supposed to make special efforts to ensure that a
child achieves a permanent resolution of her situation as soon as possible, be it through reunifi-
cation with the biological family, adoption, or some other permanent arrangement.
3 The mere fact that the judge was unaware of Rachel's situation is perhaps the best
evidence of the problems that are created by the individual-based approach traditionally taken
by our legal system in its handling of these cases. Under a family systems approach, as
demonstrated below, this fact would have been known from the beginning, and Rachel's needs
would have been addressed much earlier.
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ing. Soon thereafter, Ms. P. got a job that she was able to maintain.
Finally, after nearly three years of hearings and numerous foster place-
ments, Ms. P. and her daughters were reunited.
The family approach eventually taken in this case reflects a paradig-
matic4 shift that has occurred during the latter half of this century-from
an "individual" orientation to a "systems" orientation. 5 The corollary to
this change in the mental health field has been the emergence of "family
systems" theory.6 Family systems theory has influenced mental health
scholars and practitioners throughout this country. 7 This shift in the
mental health field is consistent with recent policy developments, such as
the concept of family preservation, which has been incorporated into fed-
eral and state laws.8
Nevertheless, many courts9 and advocates' o have lagged behind in
this process. A key reason for this judicial lag is that individual thinking
fits better with traditional legal institutions. The legal system empha-
sizes individual rights and remedies and provides for individual represen-
tation. The individual approach also fits with the traditional medical
model, which courts historically have relied upon in legal proceedings."
Further, courts have interpreted the "best interests" standard which gov-
4 "A paradigm is a coherent tradition or framework shared by a given scientific commu-
nity. It refers to a whole realm of experience, including beliefs, values, and methodology,
subscribed to by members of that community." RAPHAEL J. BECvAR & DOROTHY STROH
BECVAR, SYSTEMS THEORY AND FAMILY THERAPY: A PRIMER 2 (1982) (citing Thomas S.
Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 10 (1970)).
5 BECVAR & BECvAR, supra note 4, at 3.
6 See Edward P. Mulvey, Family Courts: The Issue of Reasonable Goals, 6 LAW AND
HUMAN BEHAVIOR 50, 54 (1982) (describing the movement toward family systems theory as a
shift in paradigms). Edward Mulvey is a Professor of Psychology at the University of
Georgia.
7 The family systems approach is a well-developed theoretical framework that has
achieved wide acceptance in the mental health fields of social work, psychology, and psychia-
try. Family systems theory is not a monolithic set of ideas, but rather is a considerable body of
literature developed by numerous scholars and practitioners. However, a unified family sys-
tems perspective is discernible, along with a set of concepts and terms. JASON MONTGOMERY
AND WILLARD FEWER, FAMILY SYSTEMS AND BEYOND 11 (1988). As used in this Article,
family systems theory refers to this unified perspective and the concepts and terms commonly
found in family systems literature. Many of these concepts have been attributed to what is
known as the "structural" or "structural-strategic" school of family systems theory. For a
detailed discussion of structural family systems concepts, see SALVADOR MmnUCmN, FAMILIES
AND FAMILY THERAPY 1 (1974).
8 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 629 (West Supp. 1993) (also known as the Family Preserva-
tion and Support Act of 1993).
9 "Courts" in this context refers to judges, referees, and other judicial officers who hear
and decide matters affecting child custody. In this article, the terms "court" and '[judge" are
used interchangeably.
10 "Advocates" in this context denotes individuals who have traditionally represented the
child's "best interests" in proceedings involving issues related to child custody, such as a
Guardian Ad Litem ("GAL") or a Court Appointed Special Advocate ("CASA").
11 Mulvey, supra note 6, at 53.
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erns all legal decision making regarding child custody by using an indi-
vidual, psychoanalytic approach. Courts and advocates thus cling to an
individual orientation toward children despite the fact that this approach
does not reflect the larger scope of current professional knowledge about
children and families.
This Article describes family systems theory and demonstrates its
consistency with certain laws and policies already in place. It posits a
new standard, consistent with the best interests of children, that courts
and advocates should apply to all legal decisions affecting child custody:
the least destructive arrangement to the continuity of family relation-
ships.12 The Article goes on to outline specific guidelines stemming
from this standard. It then revisits this opening case scenario, describing
how the case would have progressed had the judge applied family sys-
tems theory throughout the proceedings.
I. FAMILY SYSTEMS THEORY
A family is a living system, an entity, whose members are its inter-
acting parts. Throughout this Article, the term "family" is defined as
interaction characterized by intimacy or attempts to gain intimacy.' 3 A
family, therefore, includes individuals who share or seek to share inti-
mate relationships with each other. This definition includes biological
parents, even if the parents have had little or no contact with their child,
so long as they seek to form an intimate relationship with the child. It
also encompasses foster parents and stepparents, as well as certain neigh-
bors or friends, so long as they truly have a relationship of intimacy with
a child.14
12 GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, DIVORCE, CHILD CUSTODY AND THE
FAMILY 88 (1980); Jack C. Wall & Carol Amadio, An Integrated Approach to Child Custody
Evaluation: Utilizing the "Best Interest" of the Child and Family Systems Frameworks, 21
JOURNAL OF DIVORCE AND REMARRIAGE 46 (1994). In 1980, a consortium of mental health
scholars and practitioners, known as the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry ("GAP"),
articulated a standard and set of guidelines very similar to those proposed in this Article. The
Article diverges from the GAP, however, on a fundamental premise of its work: the GAP
specifically limits its recommendations to custody situations arising in the context of divorce
and expressly excludes custody situations arising in the context of foster care and adoption.
According to the GAP, in foster care and adoption situations, the ideas of Goldstein, Freud,
and Solnit apply. Id. at 77 ("[t]he proposals advanced in their work appear valid, as they apply
to adoption and foster care."). In contrast, this Article supports the application of the pro-
posed standard and guidelines to all legal decisions involving child custody. For further dis-
cussion of the proposals of Goldstein, Freud and Solnit, see infra notes 63-68 and
accompanying text.
13 MONTGOMERY & FEwER, supra note 7, at 106.
14 This definition of family is intentionally inclusive, to the extent that a child's family
should include all individuals with whom a child has an existing attachment or a future interest
in an attachment. The latter category specifically includes biological parents and close rela-
tives, such as siblings, even if the child is unfamiliar with them at birth or in early childhood.
See Katherine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal
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The individual is a part of the whole, not simply a whole unto her-
self.15 According to family systems theory, the only way to understand a
person fully is to look at that individual in the context of her family and
to understand the family's interaction.' 6 In contrast with the study of
individuals, which focuses on the inner workings of the human mind,
family systems theory focuses on the dynamics of interpersonal relation-
ships and their contexts.' 7 Another way to conceptualize this contrast is
that while individual approaches attempt to understand people from the
inside out, family systems theory attempts to understand them from the
outside in.' 8
An important feature of family systems theory is that it departs from
a linear cause-and-effect type of thinking. Instead, the systems perspec-
tive moves to a notion of mutual interaction. ' 9 It is not just that A influ-
ences B, but B influences A.20 Responsibility is therefore a shared
phenomenon. 2' Mutual interaction and shared responsibility mean that
every member of the family system is important in terms of understand-
ing a particular problem or condition. The problem "belongs" to the
family and not to any particular individual. The concept of shared re-
sponsibility goes to the heart of the family systems perspective, inas-
much as it places responsibility on all family members for observed
behaviors, regardless of which family member exhibits the behavior.
These notions of mutual interaction and shared responsibility are
difficult to grasp in our society, which places great emphasis on singular
causation and individual responsibility. Moreover, to appreciate these
concepts, one must depart from a judgmental framework. Stating that
everyone in the family system in some way contributes to the family's
condition does not involve attaching blame to any member of the family,
unlike many legal processes. Full acceptance and integration of a family
systems perspective would therefore require a fundamental rethinking
and restructuring of the legal system. These critical differences in ap-
proaches may go a long way toward explaining why courts and advo-
cates have not integrated family systems thinking.22
Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879, 904-05
(1984); Carol Amadio and Stuart L. Deutsch, Open Adoption: Allowing Adopted Children to
"Stay in Touch" with Blood Relatives, 22 J. FAM. L. 59, 82-83 (1983-84).
15 STEPHEN J. ScHu'Lz, FMILY Sys;TEms THERAPY: AN INTErRATION 13 (1984) (citing
SALVADOR MINuciN, FAmmS AND FAMIy THERAPY 9 (1974)).
16 BECvAR & BECVAR, supra note 4, at 6.
17 Id.
18 ScHuLz, supra note 15, at 58.
19 BECVAR & BECVAR, supra note 4, at 6-7.
20 Id.
21 MONTGOMERY & FEWER, supra note 7, at 37-40.
22 Id.
1996]
6 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
Another key principle of family systems is that the whole is greater
than the sum of its parts.23 Thus, the family system has properties not
found in any single member.24 Since the family system is an entity with
properties of its own, those properties may be described and analyzed as
a means of understanding the family system and, ultimately, as a means
of helping the family function more effectively.
The conceptual framework of family systems describes a family's
properties using structural characteristics and roles commonly found in
families. One such structure is the "subsystem," which would include a
"coalition." Coalitions consist of two or more family members and may
promote unity and harmony in a family or may be divisive. 25 A stable
coalition between parents, as well as other generationally based coali-
tions, may be helpful for effective parenting. 26
On the other hand, coalitions may be destructive forces, particularly
when they engage in "triangulation." Triangulation occurs when two
members of a system are in conflict and each tries to make an ally of
another family member in an attempt to avoid true resolution of the con-
flict. A typical scenario is when parents who are in conflict vie for the
alliance of the same child. The child who is triangulated may either be-
come the scapegoat, or possibly the tyrant, by being given the power to
play one parent against the other.27 Thus, coalitions often become de-
structive when families blur generational lines.
Another set of structural characteristics relates to how families man-
age new information, both externally (i.e., adaptability to new circum-
stances) and internally (i.e., ability to share information among members,
reflecting the level of intimacy).2 8 A family must be able to receive new
information effectively such that it maintains its distinctness from its ex-
ternal environment but is still able to accept useful information. The
amount of information entering and leaving a family reflects its relative
"openness." 29 Families that are too open lack cohesion, while families
that are too closed become overly rigid.30
The way information enters and leaves a family system is through
its "boundaries". 31 The relative permeability of a family's boundaries is
another way to refer to its relative openness or closedness. "Boundaries"
also refers to communication within families. Families with unclear or
23 See ScHuLTZ, supra note 15, at 56-57.
24 MONTGOMERY & FEWER, supra note 7, at 106.
25 Id. at 107, 110.
26 hd at 108 (citing SALVADOR MINUCHIN, FAMILIES AND FAMILY THERAPY (1974)).
27 Id. at 109.
28 Id. at 110-117.
29 Id. at 117.
30 BEcvAR & BECVAR, supra note 4, at 11.
31 Id.
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diffuse boundaries are often described as "enmeshed," while families
with very rigid boundaries are described as "disengaged." 32 Members of
highly-enmeshed families are unable to differentiate their thoughts and
feelings from each other. Such families will resist any efforts by individ-
ual members to separate or initiate change.33
Yet another important set of properties relates to how systems deal
with stability and change.34 Families, like other systems, strive to main-
tain stability and integration and at the same time must adapt to many
types of change, such as changes in membership, context, and relation-
ships. As families interact over time, their internal dynamics become
more patterned, while their identity becomes more distinct from the sys-
tems around them (e.g., the community, the larger society).35 A healthy
family system is able to change as the characteristics of its members and
their relationships evolve, without disrupting the essential continuity of
the system.36
A tendency towards too much stability or too much change may be
dysfunctional.37 Although stability may promote a sense of identity and
predictability, too much stability may lead to a family repeating ineffec-
tive or even destructive patterns that weaken the functioning of the fam-
ily or its members. 38 Change is healthy when it revises inappropriate
patterns, but too much change or change that is misdirected may be dis-
ruptive to a healthy family, such as when a family triangulates a child to
deflect marital discord.39 Generally, the degree of openness or closed-
ness of a family system determines whether it will tend toward stability
or change.40 A relatively open and thoughtfully creative family can act
in new ways that are completely independent from its beginnings.41
Closed families, on the other hand, will tend toward repeating limited
behaviors and patterns that were set when the system was created. 42 The
former process is known as "equifinality," while the latter is known as
"ordinality." 43 Healthier family systems move towards equifinality,
meaning that their ends are not determined by their beginnings.44
32 MONTGOMERY & FEWER, supra note 7, at 29-30.
33 LYNN HOFFMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF FAMILY THERAPY: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
FOR SYSTEMS CHANGE 72 (1981).
34 MONTGOMERY AND FEWER, supra note 7, at 121.
35 ld. at 124.
36 Id. at 130.
37 Id. at 156-57.
38 Id. at 130-31.
39 Id. at 131.
40 BEcv~A & BECVAR, supra note 4, at 17.
41 MONTGOMERY & FEWER, supra note 7, at 145.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.; BEcvAR & BEcvAR, supra note 4, at 15.
1996] .
8 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
The notion of equifinality de-emphasizes a historical perspective,
which other psychological theories view as essential for successful thera-
peutic intervention.4 5 Family systems thinking focuses more attention on
understanding "what is"-describing current functioning, as opposed to
"why"-past history and the need for insight.4 6 The manner in which the
family is presently interacting provides the therapist or other helping in-
dividual with sufficient information to intervene effectively.47 The idea
of focusing on the current functioning fits with notions of mutual interac-
tion and shared responsibility because the therapist can observe these
qualities through the interactions that take place in her presence. This
concept is also consistent with a non-judgmental approach insofar as the
need to understand why a particular behavior exists is often accompanied
by attaching blame to a particular individual.
Moreover, a family systems approach emphasizes the identification
of a family's strengths rather than its pathology.48 Family systems the-
ory operates with the philosophy that people have unused or under-used
competencies and resources that may be brought forth when constraints
are removed. One theorist refers to this approach as "mobiliz[ing] the
latent reserves of trustworthiness through the activation of mutual care,
consideration, and commitment among family members." 49  Thus, the
therapist seeks to help members of the family system reconnect with
each other through their dormant sense of mutual trust. Together with
the emphasis on current functioning and the non-judgmental approach,
the competency-based emphasis of the family systems model allows pro-
fessionals to empower the family and to build a positive treatment
atmosphere.5 0
HI. CONSISTENCY WITH CURRENT POLICY
Family systems theory maintains that in order to intervene effec-
tively to help children, one must "treat" the whole family. This approach
fits with the family preservation movement, which has had a growing
influence on child welfare policies over the past twenty years. ! In es-
45 BECVAR & BECVAR, supra note 4, at 15.
46 Id.
47 Rocco A. Cimmarusti, Family Preservation Practice Based Upon a Multisystems Ap-
proach, 71 CHILD WELFARE 241, 244 (1992).
48 Id. at 246.
49 Ivan Boszormenyi-Nagy, Contextual Therapy: Therapeutic Leverages in Mobilizing
Trust, in FAMILY THERAPY: MAJOR CONTRIBUTIONS 395, 398 (Robert Jay Green, Ph.D. &
James L. Framo, Ph.D. eds. 1981).
50 Id.
51 Anthony N. Maluccio et aL, Protecting Children by Preserving Their Families, 16
CHILDREN AND YOUTH SERVICES REV. 295, 296-97 (1994); Duncan Lindsey, Family Preserva-
tion and Child Protection: Striking a Balance, 16 CHILDREN AND YOUTH SERVICES REV. 279,
283 (1994).
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sence, family preservation believes that "the best way to protect children
is to preserve as much of their families as possible. '52 The philosophy
of family preservation, consistent with family systems thinking, pro-
motes sustaining family ties with all members of a child's kinship net-
work but does not dictate a particular outcome in every instance. Family
preservation means "helping each child to achieve and maintain, at any
given time, their optimal level of reconnection-from full reentry into
the family system to other forms of contact, such as visiting, that affirm
the child's membership in the family. '53
Family preservation efforts encompass both "reintegration" and
"reunification." 54  Reintegration, the physical placement of the child
with the biological family, may not always be possible. Reunification, a
term that encompasses reintegration as one possibility, refers to the
broader idea of return to the community and emotional reconnection with
the biological family. Reunification should always be the goal, inasmuch
as -it allows the family to sustain the emotional attachments among its
members.55
The values of family preservation and family systems can be main-
tained in most families, even those in which parents seem least able to
care for their children. Both approaches call for flexibility in preserving
family bonds by responding to each child and family's individual quali-
ties and needs. They also call for fully respecting human diversity, espe-
cially culture, race, and ethnicity. Awareness of and sensitivity to
cultural uniqueness is critical, since a disproportionate number of fami-
lies receiving child welfare services are families of color.
A. CONTRAST WITH INDiVIDUAL APPROACH
Family systems theory and the family preservation movement con-
trast sharply with an individual approach to children, which has become
entrenched in our American legal tradition. The historian Michael
Grossberg traces the beginnings of this development to the nineteenth
century: "Perhaps the most enduring product of the distinctive domestic
relations law hammered out in nineteenth-century America was the legal
concept of the family as a collection of separate legal individuals rather
than an organic part of the body politic.1 56 This individual approach
contributed significantly to creating an adversarial view of the family,
which has persisted until today in the legal system.
52 Maluccio et al., supra note 51, at 295.
53 Id. at 299.
54 Christopher G. Petr & Cindy Entriken, Service System Barriers to Reunification, 76
FAmmiES Soc'y: J. CoNTEmp. HUM. SERVICES 523, 524 (1995).
55 Id.
56 MiCHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND FAmm.y IN NwnsrrEENTH-
CENrURY AMERiCA 305 (1985).
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Mary Ann Glendon, Professor of Law at Harvard University, echoes
this concern by observing that our present legal system recognizes only
the entities of the state and the individual, with nothing in between. 57
The legal image of the family emphasizes the separate personalities of
family members rather than the unitary aspect of the family, including a
trend toward the diminution of rights of parents and the treatment of
children as persons with their own rights.58 Glendon points out the prob-
lematic nature of "rights talk":
Our rights talk, in its absoluteness, promotes unrealistic
expectations, heightens social conflict, and inhibits dia-
logue that might lead toward consensus, accommoda-
tion, or at least the discovery of common ground... In
its relentless individualism, it fosters a climate that is in-
hospitable to society's losers, and that systematically
disadvantages caretakers and dependants, young and
old.59
Glendon recognizes the link between the individual-based approach
of the legal system and "rights talk." Legal professionals who have been
trained in and who have experienced a legal system deeply entrenched in
individual approaches find rights talk attractive. It meshes comfortably
with the adversarial approach to dispute resolution that is so well
grounded in the legal system. Discussions concerning so-called "chil-
dren's rights," which often pin them against so-called "parents' rights,"
have become a fixture in the dialogue among scholars and advocates
concerned about child custody matters.
When viewed through the lens of family systems theory, however,
this discussion reveals itself to be not only unproductive but miscon-
ceived. From a family systems perspective, the rights, as well as the
needs and interests of children and parents, are inextricably intertwined.
It thus makes no sense to speak of them as dichotomous, or worse, as
opposed to each other.
57 MARY ANN GLENDON, Riowrs TALK 75, 109 (1991) [hereinafter Glendon I]; see also
GROSSBERG, supra note 56, at 305 (noting that as the twentieth century arrived, the family had
virtually ceased to exist in the eyes of the law). In a later article, Glendon points out that
unlike most European constitutions, our Constitution does not even mention the family. Mary
Ann Glendon, General Report, Symposium: Individualism and Communitarianism in Contem-
porary Legal Systems: Tensions and Accommodations, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REv. 385, 397 (1993).
58 MARY ANN GLENDON, Tim TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW 102-03 (1989) [herein-
after Glendon I1]. See also Martha L. Fineman, The Politics of Custody and the Transforma-
tion of American Custody Decision Making, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 829, 840 (1989) ("[t]he
thrust of law concerning the family currently reflects an adherence to the notion that the family
is nothing more than a collection of individuals, each with specific individuated and potentially
conflicting 'rights.' ... In fact, family law has begun to reflect an assumption that the family
may be harmful to an individual's (economic, emotional, and physical) health").
59 Glendon I, supra note 57, at 14.
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Nevertheless, given this individual orientation, it is unsurprising that
the legal system continues to cling to the traditional "best interests of the
child standard," despite frequent and sustained criticism of the stan-
dard. 60 The traditional best interests standard stems from psychoanalytic
theory, which focuses on individual traits and experiences and on inter-
nal representations of childhood events.61 One scholar has described the
traditional standard as "uncompromisingly child-oriented, extrapolating
to the limit the traditional psychoanalytic emphasis on the individual. '62
The most renowned champions of this individual approach to best
interests have been Joseph Goldstein, Ann Freud, and Albert Solnit, who
co-authored a series of books addressing the standard.63 Indeed, these
authors criticized the best interests standard as it was previously being
implemented for not focusing sufficiently on the individual child's inter-
ests. They claimed that the standard was actually subordinating chil-
dren's interests to those of their parents. 64 Under their reformulation of
the standard, which they called the "least detrimental alternative," they
viewed "children's rights" as truly predominating.
Goldstein, Freud and Solnit also emphasized the importance of a
permanent custody decision being made as soon as possible, taking into
account the child's sense of time and the child's need for a continuous
relationship with the "psychological parent. '65 The psychological parent
was defined as the one individual to whom the child forms a unique
emotional attachment, which the authors posited as essential to the
child's healthy development.66 Goldstein, Freud and Solnit stated that
the psychological parent should have sole custody and should have abso-
60 See, e.g., Andrea Charlow, Awarding Custody: The Best Interests of the Child and
Other Fictions, 5 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 267, 269 (1987) ("the 'best interests of the child' is
not a standard, but a euphemism for unbridled judicial discretion"); Hillary Rodham, Children
Under the Law, 43 HARvARD EDUC. RaV. 487, 513 (1973) ("[the best interests standard] is a
rationalizatioA by decisionmakers justifying their judgments about a child's future, like an
empty vessel into which adult perceptions and prejudices are poured"). For a detailed discus-
sion and critique of the best interests standard, see Jean Koh Peters, The Roles and Content of
Best Interests in Client-Directed Lawyering for Children in Child Protective Proceedings, 64
FORDHAM L. REv. 1505 (1996).
61 Jeffrey P. Wittman, Family Therapists as Expert Witnesses: Helping Family Court
Understand a New Language, 16 FAMILY TmRAmPY 227, 232 (1989) (citing M.P. NICHOLS,
FAMILY TamEaY: CONCEPTS AND METHODS 1 (1984)).
62 Glenn Miller, The Psychological Best Interest of the Child, 19 J. DIVORCE AND RE-
MARRIAGE 21, 27-28 (1993).
63 See, e.g., GOLDSTMN ET AL., BEYOND a BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 53-54 (1973)
[hereinafter Goldstein 1]; see also GoLDsTEN Er AL., BmoRE Ta BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHiLI 3-11 (1979) [hereinafter Goldstein II]; GOLDSTEIN Er AL., IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF
THE CHILD 90-91 (1986) [hereinafter Goldstein 111].
64 Goldstein I, supra note 63, at 54.
65 Id. at 53.
66 Id. at 19.
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lute discretion over whether the child has contact with any other parental
figures.67
These author's ideas about the child's sense of time and need for
continuity of relationships remain important contributions to courts' and
advocates' understanding of the impact of legal proceedings on children
and families. However, all of the ideas Goldstein, Freud and Solnit es-
poused were expressly based on a psychoanalytic, individual-based para-
digm of human understanding. 68 Their views take no account of a family
systems approach. Yet, probably the majority of courts deciding custody
matters continue to embrace the concept of the "psychological parent"
as well as this narrow interpretation of the best interests standard,
whether or not they understand the theoretical underpinnings of these
notions.
The individual psychoanalytic approach fits with the medical
model, which has long been an accepted approach in legal proceedings.
According to one scholar, the legal system has traditionally relied upon
medical diagnostic expertise, and continues to cling to the individual-
based medical model which attempts to isolate the cause of family dys-
function and prescribe an appropriate remedy. 69 Although the judiciary
has given lip service to a family focus, "true adoption of a family per-
spective by the legal system will require more than a mere semantic
shift."70
B. REFORMULATING "BEST INTERESTS" AS THE "LEAST DESTRUCTIVE
ARRANGEMENT TO THE CONTINUITY OF FAMILY
RELATIONSHIPS"
Under a family systems approach, an adequate custody decision re-
quires an evaluation of the total family and its relationships. "No single
principle or finding concerning an individual member can determine a
'best' resolution to a custody conflict, since that principle or finding
67 Id. at 38. For a detailed discussion of psychological parent theory, see Peggy Cooper
Davis, The Good Mother: A New Look at Psychological Parent Theory, 22 N.Y.U. REv. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 347 (1996). Davis notes that Goldstein, Freud and Solnit urged law reform
protecting psychological parent relationships, including insulating such relationships from any
contact unwanted by the psychological parent. Id. at 347-48. She further attributes these
authors with spurring the movement to terminate parental rights quickly, presumably so that
children can achieve permanence through adoption. Id. at 348. See also Jean Koh Peters,
supra note 60, at 1537-1550.
68 See Goldstein II, supra note 63, at 4-5 (explicitly stating that these ideas are based on
psychoanalytic theory and focus exclusively on the child's [individual] psychological needs).
69 Professor Mulvey wrote in 1982 that the legal system has yet to shift from a medical
model to a family systems approach, despite the judiciary's articulated interest in developing
more of a "family" approach, such as through the use of family courts. Almost fifteen years
later, the legal system still has not made any significant movement in this direction. Mulvey,
supra note 6, at 53.
70 Id. at 50.
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turns out to be only a part of the matrix of the whole family."'71 More-
over, unlike the medical model, which identifies the locus of any prob-
lem as within the individual, this approach views all conditions as
resulting from the interconnected relationships among members of the
family system and their larger environments.
In sum, a child's "rights" or "interests" effectively cannot be viewed
separately from those of her parent, sibling, grandparent, or anyone else
who is part of that child's family system. The true "best interests" of the
child therefore cannot be determined apart from determining the best in-
terests of the family system. It has been recognized, however, that use of
the term "best" is misleadingly optimistic when applied to most legal
decision making affecting children. Realistically then, courts and advo-
cates should try to achieve the least destructive arrangement to the con-
tinuity of family relationships.
The theoretical support for this position derives not only from fam-
ily systems literature but also from psychological literature on attach-
ment. Research and theory support the need to sustain children's
attachments to multiple caregivers, including their biological families,
even when children no longer live with their biological families. Attach-
ment theorists start with the premise that children form important attach-
ments of different kinds with many individuals, including biological
parents and adoptive parents. 72 They argue that a child should continue
contact with the biological parent (even after an adoption occurs) in or-
der to enhance the child's healthy development.73
The doctrine of family integrity also supports the adoption of the
"least destructive arrangement to the continuity of family relationship" as
the preferred legal standard. This doctrine derives from a number of
Supreme Court cases acknowledging "the right of the family unit to re-
main together and to function as a family."74
71 GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, supra note 12, at 83.
72 For a detailed discussion of this literature, see Davis, supra note 67. Davis states that
numerous researchers have consistently found that "even abused or neglected children main-
tain strong, if insecure and anxious, attachments to their original caregivers." Id. at 349 n. 11.
73 Susan L. Brooks, Note, Rethinking Adoption: A Federal Solution to the Problem of
Permanency Planning for Children With Special Needs, 66 N.Y.U. L. RnV. 1130, 1139 (1991)
(citing ARTHUR D. SOROSKY ET AL., THE ADOPTION TRIANGLE-SEALED OR OPEN RECORDS:
How THEY AFFECaT ADoirE's, BIRTH PARENTS, AND ADOPTIVE PARENTS 219-25 (1984); Linda
F. Smith, Adoption-The Case for More Options, 1986 UTAH L. REV. 495, 532-33, 540 (1986)).
Attachment theory (as well as family systems theory) would also support the continuity of
children's relationships with foster families in situations in which children return to their bio-
logical families after forming intimate bonds with foster families.
74 See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (protecting fa-
milial right of grandmother, her son and two grandsons, who were not brothers, and striking
down as unconstitutional ordinance prohibiting such a living arrangement as impermissible
intrusion into protected area of family life); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431
U.S. 816, 842 (1977) (reaffirming that family originates and exists apart from state); Wiscon-
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Moreover, when properly understood, this standard is consistent
with a true understanding of the "best interests" of the child. From a
family systems perspective, the two are complementary rather than op-
posing concepts. The "least destructive arrangement" is a better articula-
tion of what the standard seeks to achieve, however, because it
emphasizes the importance of the continuity of family relationships.
Framing the standard in the negative (as Goldstein, Freud and Solnit did)
also makes sense because once a family becomes entangled in the legal
system, it would be a fallacy to suggest that anyone can truly promote a
best option for a child.
Perhaps promoting what is "best" is not even a proper role for
courts and advocates. It is crucial to respect family autonomy in trying
to assist vulnerable children and families. This is truly a situation in
which the slogan "do no harm" applies with great force. Unfortunately,
children are harmed, albeit with good intentions, by severing their rela-
tionships with their families. In considering a child's best interests, the
continuity of family relationships therefore must be a priority. By using
the least destructive arrangement to the continuity of family relationships
as the standard, the child's best interests are placed in the proper perspec-
tive-one which views the child as an integral member of the family
system.
III. THE GUIDELINES
This new standard translates into five basic guidelines for judges,
advocates and other legal decision makers in the area of child custody:
(1) identify the members of the family system; (2) consider the mutual
interests of all members; (3) maintain family ties and continuity wher-
ever possible; (4) emphasize current status; and (5) focus on family
strengths.75
First, identify who makes up the family system. This task may not
be as simple as it might appear. The family system, which is defined by
bonds of intimacy, may include the extended family, such as cousins and
grandparents, or it may be made up of individuals who have no biologi-
cal connection to each other.76 In many instances, it may be a combina-
tion of the two. What is important is to look expansively at the
attachments of the child and respect all of those attachments. If possible,
sin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1972) (affirming the importance of right to create and
perpetuate private family culture). For a detailed discussion of the doctrine of family integrity,
see J. Bohl, "Those Privileges Long Recognized": Termination of Parental Rights Law, The
Family Right to Integrity and the Private Culture of the Family, 1 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J.
323 (1994).
75 Wall & Amadio, supra note 12, at 46-48.
76 See supra text accompanying notes 13-14.
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the entire family system should participate in the court proceedings, but,
at a minimum, the entire family system should be included in any deter-
minations or interventions.
Second, consider the mutual interests of all family members. This
guideline reflects a dramatic departure from the current model.77 It re-
quires an appreciation of the concepts of mutual interaction and shared
responsibility, which are essential to family systems thinking. It also
requires a non-judgmental approach that de-emphasizes blame. Under
these principles, the court system does not absolve individuals of respon-
sibility, but rather recognizes that all members of the family system play
a role in perpetuating destructive patterns and behaviors. Harmful be-
haviors will persist unless the court addresses them in terms of the entire
family system.
Under this guideline, undue weight should not be given to a child's
expressed preference. The practice of suggesting that the child express a
preference, or worse, of leaving the decision up to the child, places that
child in a situation of conflicting loyalties, creating a potentially harmful
emotional and psychological burden on the child.78 Rather, allow the
child, as well as the other members of the family system, to express their
views, but be clear that determinations related to custody and visitation
will be based on many factors.
Courts and advocates unfamiliar with family systems thinking may
question this guideline, suggesting that the child's expressed preferences
should be the sole consideration in decisions affecting child custody.
This way of thinking is misguided and may actually do a disservice to
children and families. In the first instance, it assumes that families are
merely collections of individuals with distinct bundles of "rights," rather
than mutually interacting and interconnected wholes.
Further, it misapprehends the therapeutic goal for many, if not most,
families who become involved in the legal system, which is to empower
parents and restore them in the proper parental role. Children in such
families often have been "parentified"-given too much decision making
power in their families. In attempting to protect the child's interests by
promoting the child's preferences, the well-intentioned advocate may in-
advertently reinforce this dysfunctional pattern.
The legal system itself reinforces the family's dysfunction merely
by identifying the child as the subject and object of the proceedings.
This approach epitomizes the extent to which the medical model infuses
our legal system. In reality, the family system has the problem, even if
the child is exhibiting the symptoms. The fact that the child has been
77 See supra text accompanying notes 19-22.
78 GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, supra note 12, at 96.
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victimized in some way means that the family's issues have been dis-
placed onto the child, as in triangulation. By focusing primary attention
on the child, the legal system exacerbates this displacement and thereby
harms rather than helps the child and the family. 79
When courts and advocates consider the interests of all family mem-
bers, the child gains relief by becoming less of the focus, and the parent
assumes greater responsibility as well as greater control in the family.
Nevertheless, applying this guideline does not mean ignoring the differ-
ence between the child's role and the parent's role, or their relative
power. It simply means that in order to assess what is "best" for the
child, one must fully understand and appreciate the dynamics of the en-
tire family system.
Third, maintain the continuity of family ties wherever possible. In
situations involving an immediate risk of harm to a family member, a
court may be forced to suspend contact between family members for a
period of time. Generally, though, courts should promote continuity of
the family system. This guideline supports arrangements such as open
adoption, so-called weak adoption,80 and "shared family care." 81 It also
supports shared custody arrangements, wherever feasible, as well as lib-
eral visitation.
A logical extension of this guideline is that courts and advocates
should promote alternative dispute resolution mechanisms like mediation
rather than adversarial processes for deciding matters affecting children.
Support for non-adversarial approaches promotes continuity. For exam-
ple, research has shown that mediated divorces result in a higher propor-
tion of shared parenting arrangements, more stable child-non-custodial-
79 For instance, in the scenario described above, the identification of Sarah as the focus
of the legal proceedings meant that Sarah continued to exhibit all of the "symptoms" of the
family's problems, resulting in even greater trauma to her than her initial victimization. Sarah
experienced at least five foster placements, including almost a month in a locked unit of an
adolescent psychiatric hospital, a month in an emergency shelter, and two failed foster homes.
While in the in-patient psychiatric unit, Sarah began showing signs of depression, including a
hunger strike lasting several days. While at the emergency shelter, she continued to appear
depressed and, despite her protests, was given anti-depressant medication. In school, Sarah
went from being a reasonably good student with no behavior problems to having numerous in-
school and out-of-school suspensions. Once the family was reunited, these "problems" soon
dissipated, but Sarah undoubtedly was harmed as a result of the prolonged separation from her
family.
80 Candace M. Zierdt, Make New Parents But Keep the Old, 69 N.D. L. REv. 497, 498-
99 (describing a weak adoption as one in which some, but not all, parental rights would be
terminated, such that a biological parent would still be able to visit with her child, but the
adoptive parent would have custody rights).
81 Richard P. Barth, Shared Family Care: Child Protection and Family Preservation, 39
SOCIAL WORK 515, 515 (1994) (describing shared family care as planned provision of out-of-
home care to biological parents and children so that the parent and host caregiver together care
for the child and work toward independent in-home care for the child by the parents).
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parent relationships, and a higher rate of fulfillment of child support
obligations. 82
Some states are now experimenting with alternative dispute mecha-
nisms that embrace family systems thinking in a more direct manner,
such as family group decision making. 83 One example of this approach
is the family group conference, an alternative dispute mechanism that
originated in New Zealand. 84 The family group consists of extended
family members and close family friends, who meet privately to decide
whether a child has been abused or neglected and to develop a plan for
protecting the child. Thus, consistent with a family systems approach,
the family, broadly defined, assumes responsibility for the identification
of the problem and the development of solutions.85
Courts and advocates may challenge the continuity of family rela-
tionships, which may incorrectly be perceived as inconsistent with the
goal of "permanency." Permanency is the concept of placing every child
in a permanent home, be it with the child's biological family or with an
adoptive family. The goal of permanency has been an important plat-
form for many policy makers.86 Supporters of permanency may oppose
legal solutions that maintain family ties with a biological family if the
child is living elsewhere, such as with a relative or foster family. When
properly understood, however, this guideline is consistent with and
serves to promote permanency for children.
The goal of achieving permanency for an increased number of chil-
dren is often mistakenly linked with the goal of increasing the number of
proceedings terminating parental rights. There are two problems with
the termination of parental rights in many instances: (1) it fails to recog-
nize the importance to children's healthy development of maintaining the
continuity of family ties wherever possible and (2) it does not fit with the
reality of the lives of most children whose families are involved in the
legal system.87
82 Susan Zaidel, Ethical Issues in Family Law, 12 MEDIcIFE AND LAW 263, 267 (1993).
83 Joan Pennell and Gail Burford, Widening the Circle: Family Group Decision Making,
9 J. CHILD & YotrH CARE 1 (1994).
84 See MARK HARnrN, FAMIY GRoUP CONFERENCES IN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT
CAsEs: LEARNING FROM THE EXPERIENCE OF NEw ZEALAND (1996).
85 Id. at 3-5.
86 Brooks, supra note 73, at 1146 (citing Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of
1979, S. Rep. No. 336, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1980)).
87 A third problem which is tangential to the issues raised here is that involuntary termi-
nation of parental rights by itself does not ensure permanency for children. Martin Guggen-
heim, Professor of Law and Director of Clinical and Advocacy Programs at New York
University School of Law, recently completed an empirical analysis of the effects of increased
prosecutions of termination of parental rights proceedings. Professor Guggenheim found,
based upon data from Michigan and New York, that children were being left in a worse posi-
tion as a result of the increased number of termination proceedings, in that "states are destroy-
ing the legal relationship between parents and children for no good purpose and that, as a
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Research and theory support the need to sustain children's attach-
ments to their biological families, even when the children no longer are
able to live with their biological families. According to Matthew B.
Johnson, Ph.D., a clinical psychologist speaking at a 1992 Conference on
the Termination of Parental Rights held at Rutgers University School of
Law:
[w]ithin the whole issue of advocacy in children's fights
there needs to be an appreciation for the importance of
the child's right to maintain contact with their [sic] bio-
logical family. Even if the biological family can-
not . . . assume custodial care, visitation should be
encouraged, even if there is a long term foster placement
or adoption. There is a lot of evidence to support this.
When I say evidence I mean empirical evidence, psy-
chologists and other mental health professionals have
conducted research that indicates that it strengthens the
child and contributes to the child's adjustment in foster
care or adoptive placement when they maintain some
type of contact with the biological parent.88
As stated earlier, the theoretical support for this position derives not only
from family systems literature but also from psychological literature on
attachment.
Further, the termination of parental rights does not fit with the real-
ity of the lives of most children who are involved in the legal system.
Whether or not legal ties are severed, many children continue to have
some form of contact with their biological parents. 89 Severing such ties
is also traumatic for children, who remain attached to biological parents
and other adult figures who share, or seek to share, intimate relationships
with them.90 We have come to accept these principles to a great extent
result, a record number of children have become legal orphans." Martin Guggenheim, The
Effects of Recent Trends to Accelerate the Termination of Parental Rights of Children in Fos-
ter Care-An Empirical Analysis in Two States, 29 FAM. L. Q. 121, 121-22 (1995).
88 Transcript: Conference on Termination of Parental Rights Held on November 19,
1992, 15 WoMEN's RTs. L. REP. 53, 68 (1993). See also Amadio & Deutsch, supra note 14, at
63 (citing ARTHUR D. SOROSKY Er AL., THE ADOPTION TRIANGLE: THE EFFECTS OF THE
SEALED RECORD ON ADOPTEES, BIRTH PARENTS AND ADOPTIVE PARENTS 214 (1979), as "a
significant social research study provid[ing] support for the idea of open adoption.")
89 Davis, supra note 67, at 370 (quoting Rita S. Eagle, Airplanes Crash. Spaceships Stay
in Orbit: The Separation Experience of a Child "In Care", 2 J. PSYCHOTHERAPY PRAC. &
RES. 318, 331 (1993)) ("'past ties are tenacious, [ ] they may have persisting effects in chil-
dren's lives, and [ ] respect for these ties by new caretakers may help, rather than hinder, the
development of new relationships"').
90 Id. ("adults must transcend differences of class, race, history, and parenting capacity to
provide for each foster child as cooperative a network of care as the child's decidedly disad-
vantageous circumstances will allow ... Termination of parental rights will sometimes be
constructive, but will more often be irrelevant or detrimental.").
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in the context of divorce custody decision making9' but are reluctant to
transfer that knowledge to our thinking about children in the foster care
system.92 Nevertheless, the legal system needs to accept that maintain-
ing the continuity of family ties is equally important for children who are
separated from their biological families as a result of legal proceedings
related to foster care and adoption as for children whose parents divorce
each other.93
Fourth, emphasize the current functioning offamily members rather
than their past experiences. This guideline means that professionals
should mainly focus on developing a complete and thorough assessment
of the family's present status, rather than dwelling on past motives or
incidents. Past experiences may need to be considered, however, to the
extent that they are part of the family's current functioning.
To take a difficult example, even in a family with a history of do-
mestic violence, one should seek a professional's thorough assessment of
the family's current functioning. This assessment would look beyond
superficial conduct to determine whether the issues related to the fam-
ily's history of domestic violence have been resolved. It would focus on
current status, such as whether all family members have received and
benefited from treatment aimed at addressing the domestic violence and
any related issues, such as substance abuse. At the same time, this guide-
line would prevent a court from allowing a factor such as a parent's his-
tory of mental illness to interfere with its decision making.
Finally, focus on the family members' strengths rather than their
deficiencies. The implementation of this guideline, by itself, would con-
tribute a great deal toward the effectiveness of interventions initiated
through the legal system. From the instant a petition alleging abuse or
neglect is filed in juvenile court, the legal system passes judgment on the
competence of the family and, specifically, the competence of parents.
Parents are then supposed to prove that they are competent, while being
treated as if they were not. Instead, courts and advocates need to em-
power parents-to assist them in drawing upon the mutual and collective
strengths within their family systems. Qualified, licensed, professional
family therapists can assist families in this process. Family therapists
91 See Zaidel, supra note 82, at 267 (noting that the two most important variables serv-
ing the child's interest after a divorce are: (1) a stable, ongoing relationship between the child
and both parents and (2) the absence of conflict between the parents during and after the
divorce).
92 Factors contributing to this reluctance include the court's interest in "judicial econ-
omy" and adoptive parents' interest in being able to create a "fictional family."
93 Marsha Garrison, Parents' Rights vs. Children's Interests: The Case of the Foster
Child, 22 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 371, 380 (1996) ("[tlhere is much to suggest that,
from the perspective of the child, these two situations present more similarities than
differences.")
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can also provide guidance to courts and advocates who are attempting to
achieve simultaneously the goals of preserving the family, ensuring the
child's safety, and working toward permanency.
These guidelines create a process for making legal decisions affect-
ing child custody, rather than dictating a particular outcome. The pro-
cess incorporates an inclusive and expansive definition of a family
system.94 It values the interests of every member of the entire family
system and, accordingly, seeks to maintain all of a child's family rela-
tionships. These guidelines apply to all legal decisions affecting child
custody, whether they occur in the context of a divorce or a neglect pro-
ceeding. They indicate areas where laws and policies need to be altered
to accommodate arrangements that will better serve all members of our
society.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE GUIDELINES
Had the judge applied a family systems approach in the case de-
scribed in the beginning of this Article, the case would have proceeded
in a dramatically different manner. The judge initially would have deter-
mined who comprised the family system. Immediately, the judge would
have discovered that the family system essentially consisted of the
mother Ms. P., the twelve-year-old daughter Sarah, and the seven-year-
old daughter Rachel, who were living together, along with two older sis-
ters who were living in separate households. The judge would have as-
sessed whether the boyfriend was part of the family system. In this
instance, he was not; indeed, the mother was willing to, and eventually
did, sever all ties with him in order to keep the family together. It should
be noted that had the boyfriend been part of the family system, the court
would have had to recognize his role in the system in assessing appropri-
ate dispositional and treatment alternatives.
Next, the judge would have considered the interests of all members.
Accordingly, the judge would have viewed the rape as symptomatic of
problems affecting the whole family. This would have translated into
intervening with the entire family system instead of solely with Sarah,
the rape victim, who, consistent with a medical model, became the indi-
vidual "patient" in this scenario. Family systems interventions would not
have ignored the rape but would have addressed it in the context of the
broader issues affecting the family. This view would have understood
that only addressing the rape and not the systemic issues would not repair
the family and therefore would not facilitate the reunification of mother
and daughters.
94 See supra text accompanying notes 13-14.
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A key intervention from the outset would have been to involve the
entire family in family therapy. The goals of family therapy would have
included: addressing the dysfunctional patterns in the family that led to
Sarah's victimization; restoring Ms. P. in the proper parental role; help-
ing Ms. P. attend to Rachel's educational and other needs; addressing
other individual issues that might surface in the course of treatment; and
coordinating the provision of any concrete services needed by the family,
such as employment and housing.
This family system was highly enmeshed, with diffuse boundaries.
The generational boundaries were particularly weak, such that Ms. P.
was unable to set appropriate limits and to act as the parent. Ms. P. also
exhibited low self-esteem and possible alcohol abuse. The predominant
emotion expressed in the family was anger. Indeed, it seemed that every
emotion was expressed as anger, and anger was constantly being dis-
placed onto others, such as the agency caseworker, both in and outside of
the family system. In addition to these issues, which could have been
addressed through family therapy, Ms. P. and two younger daughters
were basically homeless, and she was unable to sustain a job. Further,
Rachel was not attending school regularly because of the family's home-
lessness; as a result, her learning disability went undiagnosed.
These issues could have been addressed by merely looking at the
family as a whole rather than focusing solely on the rape incident and
Sarah. This intervention would have removed some of the focus from
Sarah and the rape incident, but it would have served her needs and inter-
ests more effectively than any interventions aimed at her as an individ-
ual, inasmuch as Sarah's greatest need was arguably for Ms. P. to be an
effective parental figure in her life.
Third, the judge would have attempted to maintain family ties and
continuity wherever possible. Accordingly, he might not have removed
Sarah and Rachel from their mother's care, but instead he might have
attempted to identify a safe place where they could stay together. Even if
the judge had determined that it was necessary to remove Sarah and
Rachel from Ms. P.'s care until their safety could be assured, under this
approach the judge would have ordered frequent visitation between
mother and children, along with the family therapy. This last point illus-
trates that family systems thinking does not dictate a particular outcome,
but instead defines a process with a set of guidelines that courts and
advocates should apply flexibly according to the particular concerns
identified in each situation.
Fourth, the judge would have emphasized the current status of the
family system rather than past motives. This does not mean that Ms. P.'s
inability to protect Sarah would have been ignored. This issue would
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have had to be addressed in family therapy, since it was a long-term
treatment issue for the family.
Fifth, the judge would not have blamed Ms. P. for her deficiencies
but instead would have focused more on her strengths. The judicial sys-
tem would have used its energies to identify how to shore up the family
system so that reunification could occur. As indicated earlier, this sup-
port for the current needs of the family members and the system as a
whole would have included assistance with concrete needs, such as em-
ployment and housing.
CONCLUSION
Our legal system purports to care about children. Indeed, genuine
concern for children motivates courts and advocates. Yet, in our efforts
to help children, we often condemn their parents. Perhaps we derive a
sense of security by treating these "bad" individuals differently from our-
selves. Perhaps we want retribution, which we achieve by depriving
these parents of the thing they cherish most-their children.
What we fail to recognize is that by these same actions, we deprive
children of something they also cherish and need-their families. If we
truly care about children, we must begin by respecting their family sys-
tems. We must accept that not all parents are capable of functioning at
the same level or capable of caring for their children in a consistent man-
ner. We must understand that the most effective way to help children is
to empower their parents and to assist them in functioning in their paren-
tal role to the best of their abilities. We must invest our legal and social
energy in strengthening families rather than judging them based upon
their weaknesses.
In the words of Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "for the sake of our
children, our first priority must be to support and work with children's
functional families, whatever forms they may take. We must affirm fam-
ily values of mutual care and help families meet the needs of their depen-
dent members." 95 Family systems thinking provides a comprehensive
model for working with children and their families toward these con-
structive purposes. If courts and advocates pursue the least destructive
arrangement to the continuity of family relationships, our legal system
may truly become a source of compassion and caring for children and
families in our society.
95 Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Children's Rights: The Destruction and Promise of
Family, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REv. 497, 505 (1993).
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